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Lines of defence
It is common knowledge that despite significant invest-
ments in railway safety technology, the amount of collisions
of trains with trains, cars or other obstacles still remains
high today, both in Europe and worldwide. The cause of
train collisions is frequently attributed to a "chain of
unfortunate circumstances" or "human error", in some
cases also to exceptional operational conditions – all 
factors which prevented a first line of defence to avoid
the risky situation. And this is exactly the crux of the matter:
serious accidents often have a highly complex pattern of
faults. Simple cause-effect scenarios are covered by 
infrastructural or operative measures. They guarantee to
a large extent that dangerous situations are identified
and avoided. However it is impossible to entirely avoid
situations that nobody has ever thought of, but which
could turn into catastrophes. And humans continue to be
the greatest element of uncertainty.
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BUILDING 2ND LINE OF DEFENCE FOR SAFER RAIL 
IMMUNOLOGISTS KNOW IT VERY WELL, HISTORIANS CAN GIVE MULTIPLE SUCCESS-
FUL EXAMPLES AND IT WASN’T IMPLEMENTED PROPERLY IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
– THE CONCEPT OF A SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE. THIS ARTICLE INTRODUCES THE
APPLICATION OF THIS CONCEPT AS A NEW APPROACH TO BOOSTING SAFETY MAR-
GINS IN TODAY’S RAILWAY SYSTEMS.
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How can accidents be avoided?
This is one of the questions addressed by trans-
port research at the German Aerospace Center
(DLR). In the case of trains, an entirely new
approach is being explored. At the core, the
basic assumption is that there will always be
situations where even the most sophisticated
safety functions will remain ineffective.
Consequently in addition to research and
development performed to support the roll-out
of ERTMS, scientists are not concentrating on
further improving the infrastructure or operative
processes in this case. Instead they are investi-
gating how the probability of collisions can be
significantly decreased through additional
"awareness", or, more specifically, “awareness-
creating measures”.
At the end of the day, once again humans are
at the end of the chain of events, in the form of
the driver. It actually appears quite simple: as
soon as the driver knows what awaits him on
his route, he can react properly. For a train
driver this generally means braking. There are no
other options in situations such as a construc-
tion vehicle in the middle of the track section
which has, in fact, been exclusively cleared for
the train.
Technically this “second line of defence” situa-
tion awareness can be enabled by transmitting
traffic situation information via radio communi-
cations to any train. Each vehicle equipped
with a suitable receiver unit can perform a data
fusion of all the available information about
‘itself”, e.g. position, speed, planned routing etc,
in relation to all other vehicles in the vicinity;
and by doing so, it performs a distributed situ-
ation analysis to identify potentially upcoming
critical situations.
Ad-hoc, direct communication
A particular innovative approach for imple-
menting this radio communication is ad-hoc,
direct communication between the trains, i.e.
without any base station network or any
other railway infrastructure-based component.
While for other means of transport similar ad-
hoc radio communication based systems for
avoiding collisions are already in daily use (ADS-
B in aviation, AIS in the maritime domain), this
is a radically new approach in the rail sector.
The desired ad-hoc properties, i.e. self-organ-
isation (no special configuration required
before a connection is established) and
decentralism (no central control nodes), per-
fectly match the requirements of a second
line of defence distributed situation awareness.
Analysis suggests that the whole collision
avoidance application does not require any
connection-oriented communication, which
would be too time consuming because of the
extra delay introduced by the connection set-
up and disconnection phases. Instead, the
whole functionality can be established through
multi-broadcast, i.e. none of the conflict detec-
tion algorithms require a consecutive sequence
of communication packets between each two
communication peers.
Following this design approach, each train or sta-
tionary object, such as the above mentioned
construction vehicle, appropriately equipped with
a transceiver unit, transmits its current position,
speed, the planned routing
(if known) and other data
(e.g. obstacle clearance
limits) to all receivers in the
region (broadcast/-geocast).
The regional relevance of
the information exchanged
(relatively low probability
of collisions for trains far
apart) directly maps to the
non-centralised   commu-
nication control, hence
there is no need for a cen-
tralised,infrastructure-based
backbone network.
Robust and reliable
Apart from safety-of-life
level positioning issues, the
most challenging aspect of
this approach is designing
a robust and reliable 
communication link. The
connection-less communi-
cation, for instance, only
allows forward error 
correction mechanisms on
the communication link.
The Cell-based, Orientation-aware MANET Broadcast (COMB) is a medium access scheme developed by the DLR[1]
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Trains (RCAS) 5 200 40
Ships (AIS) 40 60 1.5
Aircraft 56 1000 18
(TCAS, ADS-B)
Comparison of network dynamics
The table above reveals how the degree of
topological network dynamics is more demand-
ing for trains than for aircraft, which has a direct
influence on the reliability of the communica-
tion between vehicles. To tackle the problem
of radio medium access in an uncoordinated,
ad-hoc network, DLR has developed an
extremely robust, medium access scheme via a
combined time-division/code-division tech-
nique, making particular use of location
information[1]. This scheme is illustrated on
page 93.
Designing to measure
By looking at the deployment scenarios for such
a radio-supported, infrastructure-less, collision
avoidance system, it is clear that the benefits do
not lie primarily with high-speed rail networks.
Here, thanks to largely crossroad-free routes,
ultra modern, ETCS-equipped traction units and
other measures, the probability of collisions is
far lower than with regional networks or in
shunting yards. While the collision impact
energy may not be so great in shunting yards
due to lower speeds, the overall probability of
collisions is higher. As a result, the communi-
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 The Railway Collision Avoidance
System (RCAS) project, part of the
DLR's transport research programme,
began in 2007. It involves the
Institute of Communications and
Navigation, Institute of Robotics
and Mechatronics and Institute of
Transportation Systems
 The RCAS is a 'safety overlay' system
that can be deployed on top of any
existing safety infrastructure in train
networks
 The core idea is to broadcast the
position and intended track of trains,
as well as additional data like vehi-
cle dimensions, to all other trains in
the area using ad-hoc train-to-train
communications. This enables train
drivers to have up-to-date and
accurate knowledge of the traffic sit-
uation in the vicinity, and act in
consequence
 Computer analysis of the received
information in relation to the train’s
own position and movement vector,
based on an electronic track map,
detects possible collisions. This is
followed by an alert signal and
advice for the driver on the best
response to avoid the danger
 The system can be adapted to a
variety of situations, e.g. advancing
trains, road vehicles or obstacles
$
Mode of
transport 
(Anti Collision
System)
Minimum
communica-
tion range
(km)
Maximum
velocity
(km/hr)
Topological
network 
dynamics
(velocity divi-
ded by range)
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SCIENTISTS... ARE INVESTIGATING HOW THE
PROBABILITY OF COLLISIONS CAN BE SIGNIFI-
CANTLY DECREASED THROUGH ADDITIONAL
"AWARENESS", OR, MORE SPECIFICALLY,
“AWARENESS-CREATING MEASURES” ”“
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cation system must be designed according to
the reaction times of the speed profile. As typ-
ical speeds on regional networks are within a
range of 80 to 160km/hr, the resulting relative
speed of up to 320km/hr suggests a communi-
cation system designed to detect the potential
danger of two trains approaching each other if
they are at least five kilometres apart, i.e. a
minimum transmission power must be chosen
so that each train “violating” a five kilometre
zone can receive the signal[2].
Calculations reveal that the system needs to be
designed for at least 500 potentially simultane-
ously transmitting stations, i.e. trains and other
objects, in an area with a diameter of about
ten kilometres. As with any radio transmission
system, the dimensioning is closely linked to
the issue of the usable frequency range. In
addition to the general technical conditions (the
propagation conditions of radio signals are, for
example, frequency-dependent[3]), regulatory
aspects are equally important here. There are
frequency ranges that are already intended for
rail operations use (e.g., 460 MHz).
Unfortunately they vary according to global
regions and are also restricted to certain types
of applications.
Gaining advantages
The ad-hoc, base station-less communication
principle also has a big advantage because
no infrastructure investments are needed,
unlike, for example, when introducing the rail-
specific variant of the GSM-R mobile network.
A migration scenario, in other words, a scal-
able, step-by-step introduction of the
system, also already exists. While not so much
a critical issue for small island-networks such
as a closed company, railway network, this is
vital for all other, non-island-networks. All
trains equipped with the necessary technolo-
gy can analyse the received traffic situation
information and cross-reference it with infor-
mation about their own routes in order to
issue warnings of any potential dangerous
situation. All trains not (yet) equipped with this
technology can proceed in accordance with
the present (infrastructure-based) safety
standards.
By following this so-called "Safety Overlay"
concept, none of the current safety systems
(LZB, ERTMS etc.) are replaced. However any
equipment on board the train may help
better represent the current situation – for
instance, map data provided by an ETCS unit
and an eddy current sensor can both signifi-
cantly increase the precision and integrity of
position information. So the approach is
really a second line of defence with inde-
pendent sources of information, which
includes, in particular, an independency of
errors. The latter is especially important
because it guarantees the second line of
defence remains unaffected from problems
causing any first line to fail.
A prototype of the system, developed as part of
the DLR’s Railway Collision Avoidance System
(RCAS[4]) project, was presented to an internation-
al audience at InnoTrans 2008 (Berlin). The system
approach was implemented on model trains (see
photo left) that communicated wirelessly to each
other based on the principles outlined above.
Linking modes
Researchers and engineers at the DLR see 
potential for further solutions involving commu-
nicating with road vehicles. If, for example, the
collision avoidance system for trains could be
linked to the standardisation of Car2Car 
communication (the DLR also contributed 
significantly to this project), this could reduce
collisions between trains and road vehicles at
level crossings. On average, such small collisions
occur in Germany on two out of three days
(according to Deutsche Bahn statistics, 2004).
However this plan is already being thwarted by
the frequencies currently in use – Car2Car
communication is being standardised primarily
for the frequency range around 5.9 GHz.
For its part, the DLR has adopted a holistic
approach to its research on collision avoidance
systems for both transport modes, as part of
an intelligent transport system
Prof. Dr. Thomas Strang, Dr. Andreas Lehner &
Cristina Rico-Garcia
Institute of Communications and Navigation
German Aerospace Center (DLR)
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